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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
JESSE ANDERSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appeal From Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
Honorable 1\L J. Bronson, Judge 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATE!JENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant, Jesse Anderson, was convicted by 
a jury in the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
for having committed the crime of involuntary 
manslaughter. The defendant has appealed to this 
Court from that conviction. 
The statement of the case and of the facts as set 
forth by counsel for the appellant in appellant 'R 
brief, is, in the main, correct, and for that reason 
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we will dispense herein with any statement of the 
facts except as we refer to them in argument . 
.Counsel for the defendant has assigned numerous 
errors, 39 in all; but in his brief he combines them 
under eight headings and nine different points or 
questions for argument. A number of assignments 
are made by defendant, charging the court with 
error in the admission of certain evidence and in 
the failing to sustain objections made by the de-
fendant to certain questions. The defendant has 
not argued these assignments except with respect 
to the evidence connected with the hypothetical 
question submitted to the expert. The defendant 
by failing to argue these assignments has waived 
any claim to error he may have in connection with 
them. We will, therefore, direct our argument 
solely to the questions argued by the defendant 
under the nine subheadings in his brier. 
ARGUMENT NUMBER I. 
On pages 6 to 8 of defendant's brief, counsel con-
tends that the complaint, which was originally filed 
before the magistrate upon which the preliminary 
hearing was based, was not sufficient to charge the 
defendant with a crime and did not s'ta!te facts 
sufficient to advise the defendant of the naturr 
and cause of the accusation against him. Counsel 
cites the case of State v. Gesas, 49 Utah 181; 16:l 
Pac. 366, to the effecf that an information must 
state "the particular circumstances of the offense" 
and that under such a ·case the original complaint, 
as filed herein, failed to state sufficient facts to 
charge the defendant with involuntary man-
slaughter or with any other crime. In answer to 
this statement, we would merelv call to counsel's 
attention the fact that the original complaint and 
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the information as filed in this case were filed un-
der the reformed procedure which has been adopt-
ed in this State, and that, therefore, cases defining 
what is necessary under the earlier procedure may 
not be controlling herein. In order to get the 
matter properly before us, and to see what our 
statute requires, we would like to quote the pro-
visions of the 1935 Laws of Utah, which set up the 
form of procedure. 
Section 105-21-8, Chapter 118, Laws of 
Utah, 1935, p. 223 provides: 
"(1) The information or indictment may 
charge, and is valid and sufficient if it 
charges the offense for which the defend-
ant is being prosecuted in one or more of 
the following ways: 
'' (a) By using the name given to the 
offense by the common law or by a 
statute. . . . '' 
Section 105-21-47 of Chapter 118, Laws of 
Utah, 1935, p. 228 provides as follows: 
''The following forms may be used in the 
cases in which they are applicable: . . . 
"Manslaughter - A. B. unlawfully killed 
C. D .... " 
In the complaint as filed before the magistrate, it 
was charged that Jesse Anderson, on the 25th day 
of February, 1940, at the County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, did commit the crime of involuntary 
manslaughter. . . . 
If nothing more had been said in the complaint, 
this would have been in direct compliance ·with par-
agraph (a) of Subsection 1 of Section 105-21-8, 
~upra. The defendant, thereby, was charged with 
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a crime by using the name which has been legally 
given to that crime, both by common law and by 
statute. The defendant complains because the 
original complaint did not stop with the charge of 
the crime under the common law or statutory name, 
but went further and alleged specific facts. We 
call attention to the wording of Subsection 1 of Sec-
tion 105-21-8, where it provides that the charge is 
valid and sufficient if it charges the offense in *'-
one or more of the ways designated. 
There has been more charged in the complaint as 
originally filed than was absolutely necessary under 
paragraph (b) ; but that should not invalidate the 
charge of the crime under its common law or stat-
utory name even if what follows thereafter is not 
sufficient to make out a charge of the crime in a dif-
ferent way. There is nothing in the balance of the 
complaint which negatives the fact that the defend_ 
unt committed the crime charged, and nothing 
appears inconsistent with his having committed the 
crime. 
Counsel argues that by the particular statement in 
the latter part of the original complaint, the effect 
of the prior charge under the term ''involuntary 
manslaughter" is nullified, and he cites the case 
of State v. Rolio, 71 Utah 91; 262 P. 987, both from 
its original report and as quoted in the case of 
·Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, 80 Utah 138; 13 P. 
( 2d) 636, to the effect that where specific a.llega-
tions are in conflict with general allegations, the 
specific allegations will control. However, counsel 
fails to point out where the specific allegations ill 
this case are in conflict with the g·eneral allega-
tions. The case of State v. Rolio, cited by counsel, 
in itself shows that the contention of conl)<:;()1 ('an-
not prevail in this case. In that case, the State 
iiled a snit to qniet the title to certain land border-
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ing Utah Lake. In the con1plaint, the State alleged 
gL'llerally its ownership of the land. 'rhe complaint 
then went on to allege specificaHy that the State, 
in it~ sovereign capacity upon its admission into the 
Union as a State, became the owner in fee of and 
"·as entitled to possession of all lands underlying 
navigable water within the State, that the land in 
question at the time the State was admitted was 
covered by the water of Utah Lake; but that since 
said time, the water of the lake has receded awl 
the land in question had become "unwatered'' or 
dry land, suitable for farn1ing. 
The Court in that case did state that where title is 
alleged in general terms and then specific facts an~ 
alleged, the specific averments may be regarded as 
controlling, if they are inconsistent with the general 
allegations. The Court discussed the connection 
between the general and specific allegations in that 
complaint and then stated: 
''Thus, the general allegations in the com-
plaint as to the State's title and ownership 
are in no particular impaired, but strength-
ened by the further allegations as to the 
;State's source of title." 
In the case at bar, there is no conflict or inconsis-
tency between a general statement or charge that 
Jesse Anderson did commit the crime of involuntary 
manslaughter, and the subsequent factual allega-
tions to the effect that Jesse Anderson killed Clark 
Romney without malice contrary to the provisions 
of the statute of the State, etc. 
The words "contrary tcf the provisions of the stat-
ute'' are in effect the same as ''Jesse Anderson 
killed Clark Romney unlawfully,'' or ''A. B. killed 
·c. D. contrary to law.'' The words contrary to 
statute or contrary to law and the word unlawfully 
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have the same meaning. By Section 105-21-4 7, supra, 
the State can properly charge the crime of man-
slaughter either voluntary or involuntary merely 
by stating: "A. B. unlawfully killed C. D." 
At the oral argument the suggestion was made that 
these words ''contrary to the provisions of the 
statute,'' etc., were a necessary part of the infor-
Jnation and could not be used as supplying the 
word ''unlawfully.'' Those words are not other-
wise necessary in this -complaint. 
Chapter 143, Laws of Utah, 1937. 
Chapter 118, Section 105-21-6 and 7, Laws 
of Utah, 1935. 
In effect, the charge as it was originally filed before 
the magistrate charged the defendant with the crime 
of involuntary manslaughter in ''one or more'' of 
the ways provided and prescribed by 
Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935. 
It charged the defendant with the crime "by using 
the name given to the offense by the common law 
or by statute," as allowed by Section 8 and it 
charged the same crime in the form provided by 
Section 47. The two modes were in no manner in-
consistent, but, as was stated in the case of State 
v. Rolio, the general allegation was not impaired by 
the specific statement that followed, but, if any 
thing, was strengthened thereby, and clearly there 
was no inconsistency between the two. 
ARGUMENT NUMBER II. 
We admit as good law the cases and authorities 
cited by counsel under hiR se-cond proposition on 
pages 9 and 10 of his brief. His argument there, 
however, proceeds upon the erroneous assumption 
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that the co1nplaint before the n1agistrate was not 
sufficient and that, therefore, the defendant had 
not had a proper prelinlinary hearing. What we 
haYe ~tated under the heading Argun1ent I herein-
aboYe as well as what follows hereinafter in au-
S\Yer to defendant's argument under his third prop-
osition, we feel is a sufficient answer to show that 
the defendant's premise is wrong, and while we 
admit his authorities as good law, we most urgently 
insist that the defendant was properly charged he-
fore the magistrate and was given a proper pre-
liminary hearing. The complaint complied suffi-
ciently with the requirements of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure. The defendant was advised there-
In with respect to the charge brought against him. 
Tn addition to that, the defendant had the right to 
demand a bill of particulars if he wanted a detailed 
statement of the facts involved in the charge. He 
made such a demand and was furnished with a bill 
of particulars giving him a detailed statmnent of 
the facts for his henefit upon the prelilninary 
hearing. The trial court, therefor~, did not err in 
denying the motion to qn::tsh, and the district attor-
ney did have full authority to file thp infonnatjon 
in the cause. 
ARGUMENT Nill.fBEH III. 
'rhe matters set forth in defendant's brief in argu-
ing on his third proposition are very similar to 
those set forth in his argument under the first prop-
osition. On pages 10 and 11, counsel argues that 
the information did not advise the defendant of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him. The 
defendant does not, under this hef}ding, set forth 
the Constitutional provision, but he is evidently at-
tacking the procedurr adopted in and prescribed by 
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tional grounds. rrhis reformed procedure has al-
ready been attacked in previous cases before this 
Court, and we really feel that it is unnecessary to 
repeat the arguments cited in some of the briefs al-
ready filed on behalf of the State in those cases. 
The defendant does not state under his argument 
3 whether or not, in his opinion, the information 
complies with or meets the requirements of Chapter 
118, Laws of Utah, 1935. But a comparison with 
the statute as quoted supra reveals that it would 
be hard to draw an information which would meet 
the requirements of the statute more fully than the 
one involved here does. As we pointed out above, 
a statement that A. B. unlawfully killed C. D., a~ 
far as the meaning of the words are concerned and 
in legal effect, is no different from a statement 
charging that A. B. killed C. D. contrary to law or 
contrary to the provisions of the statutes of the 
State of Utah. If it is done contrary to the provi-
sions of a statute, it is'done unlawfully becau~e it i~ 
done contrary to law. The word "unlawfully" 
appears in the information. Thus, we respectfully 
urge that both the complaint before the magistrate 
and the infonnation filed hv the district attorney 
fully comp,ly with the sho~t- form I procedure set 
forth in Chapter 18, Laws of Utah, 1935. 
With respect to the Constitutional question, we will 
merely repeat what has been stated in previous 
briefs before this Court. This reformed procerlure 
has been adopted by our State Legislature along 
with the legislatureR of various other States in the 
Union after lengthy and detailed study on the 
matter, by and upon repommendation of the Amer-
ican Law Institute. 
The argument advanced by defendant on pag-eR 10 
and 11 of his brief hy a mere repetition reveals itR 
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absurdity. Counsel argues that the defendant can-
not tell ··whether he is charged with involuntary or 
\·oluntary n1anslaughter," and, further, "we re-
t-pectfully submit that the defendant in this case 
should have been advised in the information suffi-
cient facts to determine whether he is being charged 
with voluntary or involuntary manslaughter . . . '' 
When such arguments are advanced, it is no won-
der that the lay members of the public become dis-
gusted with the "technicalities" urged and argued 
by legal minds, and with the "hocus pocus'' which 
still exists and is practiced in the trial of law suits. 
The defendant was clearly informed that he wa:-; 
charged with involuntary manslaughter because on 
a certain day, at a certain place, he killed a man un-
lawfully, although without malice. If the defendant 
could logically argme that this isn't sufficient to in· 
form him as to the charge placed against him, he 
could just as logically a:rgne that he does not know 
what he has to meet, unless the State be -compelled 
to include and set forth in its compJaint every bit 
of detail of evidence \Yhich it expects to introduee 
at the trial. 
One of the earliest cases upholding this reformed. 
procedure repeats wHh approval some particular 
remarks of a Nmv York Commi~.sioner, concerning-
the absurdities and artificialities of the tecimical 
procedure foilowed in the past, and which counsel 
for the defendant, "-rith others, is still trying to cling 
to in order to provide a technical loophole for his 
client to crawl thrnnr~h. 
People v. Bo,?-"danoff, 254 N. Y. lG; 171 
N. E. 890; 69 A. L. R. 1~7R: 
''They are not igmorant of the fact that 
their proposed reform will strike at the root 
of a system artifjcial and absurd in itself. 
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and which is only saved from the con-
tempt it 1nerits, by the frequent use of the 
names of venerable legal authorities, under 
whose sanction it has grown and ripened 
into maturity . . . Nor will they allow 
themselves to believe that absurdities and 
fictions so glaring and gross in themselves 
as to provoke the laughter and contempt of 
the intelligent, will be perrnitted to con-
tinue longer than until a safe substitute for 
them can be found.'' 
We have been unable to find any case holding the 
short-form procedure unconstitutional; but we re-
fer the Court to the following cases, which are o 
few of the cases in which the question has been 
raised: 
People v. Brady, 272 Ill. 401; 112 N. E. 
126; Ann. Cs. 1918 C. 540 (1916). 
State v. Roy, 40 N. M. 397; 60 Pac. (2d) 
646; 116 A. L. R. 110. 
State v. Engler, 217 Iowa 138; 251 N. W. 
88. 
State v. Keturokis, 2'24 Iowa 491; 276 N. W. 
600 (1937). 
Hurd v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 880; 165 
S. E. 536. 
Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539; 38 
L. Ed. 545; 14 Sup. Ct. 680. (1893). 
State v. Continental Purchasing Company, 
Inc., 119 N. J. L. 257; 195 Atl. 827 
(1938). 
People v. Busick, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 315; 
89 Pac. (2d) 657 (1939). 
State v. Domanski, 57 Rhode Island 500; 
190 Atl. 854 (1937). 
~tate v. Capaci, 179 La. 462; 143 So. 417. 
Rosenberg- v. State, 212 Wis. 434; 249 N. W. 
541 (1933). 
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\t may be here noted that the proyisions of 
Article 1, Seetion 12 of the U tnh State Con-
stitution 
do not require that the details of the nature and 
cause of the accusation against the defendant be in-
cluded in a complaint or information. The Con-
stitution merely provides that he has the right to 
demand (which includes the right to receive) in-
formation and facts giving the nature and cause of 
the accusation. The la"' in question makes it Inan-
'1atory that the defendant he given details in a hill 
of particulars, if demanded- the Con8titutlon on1v 
gives the defendant the right to demand - and if 
not demanded the Court may still order it to hP-
given. 
\Ve confidently conclude that the provisions of :our 
statutes setting up this short-form of procedure do 
not conflict with any of thP provisions of our State 
Constitution. 
ARGUlVIENT NUMBER IV. 
In his fourth point, counsel for the appellant asserts 
that since the Bill of Particulars alleged that· the 
defendant was driving his automobile at a da~ger­
ous and excessive speed, and that the defendant did 
not stop at a stop. sign, it was i~cumbent on the 
court to instruct the jury that they must find that 
both of these acts cooperated in causing the death 
of Clark Romney. lie points out that instructions 
number five and six and six-A permitted the_ jury 
to convict the defendant if they determined that 
any one of the said acts caused the death of Clark 
Romney. He also points out that his requested in-
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structions number one and two raised this point, 
and that the court should have given those instruc-
tions. Under this argument, he also contends that 
the Stipulation, as he terms it, found at Record 235 
to 237 inclusive, was a further limitation on the 
court in this regard. 
In the first place, this was not a Stipulation. The 
colloquy between court and counsel occurred at the 
tilne that the attorney for the defendant requested 
a further Bill of Particulars, and in determining 
whether or not that further Bill should be given, the 
District Judge noted that he did not believe the 
court would permit the Sta.te to prove any facts, 
which were not specifically alleged in their Bill of 
Particulars, and with this statement, counsel for 
the State agreed. Counsel for the State pointed 
out that the State would ask that the proposition 
of reckless driving be put to the jury, but that reck_ 
tess driving would consist only of the two acts, that 
~s, excessive speed and failing to stop at a stop sign. 
In other 'W Qrds, this, colloquy only went to the 
question of what evidence the State would be per-
mitted to prove under the Bill of Particulars and 
certainly was not a limitation at that time upon the 
proof yet to be offered during1 the t:r:ial of the case. 
Counsel for the State stated the proposition in th~ 
conjunctive, just as he set forth the three acts of 
reckless driving, excessive speed, and going through 
a stop sign, in the Bill of Particulars. 
Counsel for the defendant relies upon the case of 
State v. Vance, 38 Utah 1; 110 Pac. 434, a.'s sustain-
ing his argument that the court, in its instructions~ 
should have required the jury to find that all the 
acts set forth in the Bill of Particulars cooperatecl 
in causing the death of Clark Romney, and appar· 
ently contends that if the death were caused by ex~ 
c>rssive speeding alone, that his client is not guilty. 
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The Vance case does not sustain any such prop· 
osition . 
. As originally filed, the lnfor1nation in the Vance 
case contained three counts charging the defendant 
with n1urder in each count. The first count alleged 
that the defendant, by poisoning the deceased, com· 
mitted murder. In the second count the Informa-
tion alleged that the murder was committed by kick-
ing and beating the deceased. The third count al~ 
leged that the poisoning of the deceased took place 
on one day, the kicking and heating· of the deceased 
occurred on another day, and that the two cause~ 
tog·ether resulted in the death of the deceased. The 
State distnissed the first two counts, and went to 
the jury on the third count alone. It should also l)e 
pointed out in this connection that the proof of the 
State showed that the two causes cooperated to~ 
g-ether and resulted in the death of the deceased and 
did not singly cause her death. The court in that 
case points out that if the Information had properl.~ 
alleged the poisoning and kicking and beating as 
causes of death, they could have relied on each of 
these. The Court stated: 
''If the pleader had desired to rely on the 
two causes separately as well as upon their 
combined effect. he easily could have done 
so by stating in one count that the means 
u~0d hy the appeJlant to kill were heating-, 
kicking, bruising. and by administering 
poison, and by any othPr means which the 
nleader thought the evidence might show 
were used." 
'rne Bill of Particulars in the case at bar conforms 
to this last quotation from the oninion in the Vance 
casP. The statement is that the defendant while 
driving recklessly and [lt an excessive speed anrl 
without stopping at a stop sign, collided with the 
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car of Clark Romney, from which the said Romney 
sustained injuries and fr01n which he died. We 
submit that under the Vance case, it was permis-
sible for the court, under this Bill of Particulars, 
to instruct the jury that if any one or all of said 
acts caused the death of Clark Ron1ney, they could 
find the defendant guilty of Involuntary Man-
slaughter. 
In the two Utah cases of 
State v. Rasmussen. 92' Utah 357; 68 
(2d) 176 and 
State v. Johnson, 76 Ut. 84; 287 P. 909. 
this Court indicated that where allegations were in 
the conjunctive in the Information, the Trial Court 
can give the type of instruction which was here 
given. Both of the:;;e latter cases are Involuntary 
J\1anslaughter cases. 
In the case of 
State v. Jones, 81 Utah fj03; 20 Pac. (2d) 
6141 and 
State v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274; 72 Pac. (2d) 
656. 
it is held that where a charge of Forgery is in the 
conjunctive, towit: That the defendant did make 
and pass the check in question, a conviction of For· 
gery can he had upon proof of either or both such 
making and passing. In 
Smith v. State, 186 Ind. 252; 115 N. E. 9~t3, 
the defendant was charged with Involuntary Man-
slaughter. The second count alleged that the de-
fendant violated the speed statute and drove while 
under the influence of liquor. The Court held that 
this count was not duplicitous because it charged 
one offense~ that. is, Inyoluntary ~!anslaughter. 
The defendant also contended on appeal that the 
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trial court, by its instructions, improperly per-
Initted the conviction of the defendant under this 
count on proof that the accident was the result of 
defendant's intoxiration alone. The Supren1e 
Court held that such instructions were not in error, 
and that proof of either one of these acts, thus 
alleged would sustain the conviction of the de-
fendant. 
The case of 
Thompson v. State, 41 \Vyo. 72; 283 Pac. 
151, 
is another :.\Ianslaughter case. The Court there 
held that where the offense may be committed in · 
one of several ways, the Information in one count 
may charge the commission in any one or all of the 
ways specified in the statutes, and if not incon-
~istent, and proof of either of the ways will sustain 
eonviction, the State need not elect. In 
People v. Von Eckartsberg, 133 Cal. App. 
1; 23 P. (2d) 819, 
the defendant was charged with Involuntary Man-
slaughter and contended that the evidence was in-
sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Court 
pointed out that there were three traffic law viola-
tions upon which the conviction could be based --
speed, reckless driving and driving on the wrong 
side of the road. The Court found sufficient evi-
dence to support the last traffic violation mentioned 
and held that this was enough to support the con-
viction. In 
Gore v. State, 2·5 Okl. Cr. 214; 219 P. 153, 
the Court had a situation hPfore it that came with-
in the rule herein quoted from State v. Vance, 
supra. In that case the defendant was charged 
with having murdrred tJ:e victint by· burning and 
f:hooting, hut one tran~action was involved, and the 
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Court held that there could be a conviction on either 
or both of the alleged burning and shooting. 
We submit that under the foTegoing authorities, 
the court clearly instructed the jury that the de-
fendant could be convicted if he viola.ted any one or 
more of the statutes set forth in the instruction, if 
the act in violation of said statute evinced a marked 
disregard for the rights and safety of others. 
ARGUMENT NUlVIBER V. 
Under this division of his brief, ·counsel for the 
appellant contends that the State's expert Seymour 
S. Taylor based his opinion on the speed of the de· 
fendant 's automobile at the time of the collision on 
facts other than those proven in the case or obser-
vations made by the expert himself. Counsel sets 
out portions of the abstract on the examination of 
Mr. Taylor wherein he claims that Taylor admitted 
using information outside or' the record or his own 
personal observation. It will be noted th~t the 
italicized portion of the abstract found at page 43, 
purporting to reflect the record on page 178 is not 
correct. Counsel apparently gets the italicized por-
tion from the following question and answer on that 
page of the record. 
'' Q. The opinion you have given is taking 
into consideration certain information 11(r. 
Pierce gave you at some other time~ 
"A. I read the statement of the wit-
neRses 1w has jn his police report.'' 
That is not a direct statement that he used, in 
reaching his opinion, evidence other than was in-
troduced in the case. What Mr. Taylor was un~ 
doubtedly referring to was the fact that previous 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
to the trial, he had worked out the mathematical 
calculations, and in doing so, had received eertain 
inforination fro1n the police report. However it is 
the contention of the State that all of the items 
upon which he based his opinion were introduced 
in evidence or personal observations were 1nade 
by Taylor himself. From a consideration of Tay~ 
lor's entire testimony, this last statement is ob-
viously correct. 
Mr. Taylor stated on pages 155-156 of the record 
(page 34 of the abstract) that he divided his prob-
lem into two main propositions - first, the de-
crease of speed of the defendant's automobile pre~ 
vious to the point of impact, and second, the de-
crease of speed after the impact and until the de-
fendant's autmnobile came to a complete stop. 
In the first propositions relative to the decrease 
of speed before impact, the witness Taylor took 
into consideration the length of the skid marks 
which appeared at the intersection together with 
the coefficient of friction between the tires and th8 
pavement. Officer Pierce testified that the tire 
marks were 44 feet long and that all four wheels 
were locked. (See Record 111-112; Ab. 21). As 
the coefficient, Taylor used .7. Taylor looked over 
the scene of the accident, and from his experience 
in determining the coefficient of friction, decided 
that .7 was the correct one to use. It is true that 
he did not see the intersection until one or two days 
after the acl'ident. but Officer Pierce also made 
calculations in connPdion with the decrease in 
speed caused by the skid mark~. Hnd he nserl this 
same coefficient after an examination of the inter-
~ection immediatelv aftf~r the accident occurred-
(Record 135). At .Record 165, Taylor pointed out 
the items which he took into consideration in arriv-
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ing at the decrease of speed under proposition num-
ber one, and that the formula he used had been 
accepted generally in the United States. 
Based in these items, which were either in evidence, 
or came from his personal observation, he gave it 
as his opinion that the speed of the car was de4 
creased 30.5 miles per hour by the skid marks. (See 
Record 146). In connection with this matter, it 
should he noted that Officer Pierce testified that 
the speed was de·creased 30.35 miles per hour by 
the skid marks, and the evidence came in without 
objection. (See Record 119-120). 
Taylor then stated that he took into consideration 
under the second proposition relative to the de-
crease of speed after impact, five different things. 
rrhe first was the extent of the damage done to the 
Ford car of the defendant and ~econd the damage 
done to the Oldsmobile car. Taylor personally ex-
amined both automobiles, identified the automo-
biles from exhibits which had been identified by 
persons at the scene of the accident and at the time 
thereof. Taylor called upon the experience which 
he had had in investigating and watehing collisions 
between automobiles in determining· the energy ex-
pended by the defendant's car in damage to. the 
Oldsmobile car. These considerations were a mat-
ter of personal observ·ation l)y th~_, exn(·rt. 
The third consideration was the amount of energy 
involved in forcing the Oldsmobile (driven by the 
deceased) to the pavement so that it leaped into 
the air. The energy involved in bringing about this 
result and its translation into decrease of speed 
· in miles per hour was based upon the height which 
the Oldsmobile was forced into the air and its 
weight. On the proposition of weight, Mr. Tayloe 
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took the shipping \Yeight of both automobiles, the 
Ford car being 2927 pound8, and the Oldsmobile 
3185 pounds. l\Lr. Taylor used the figure three feet 
as being the height that the Oldsmobile ·reached. 
The witness Alex Engstrom testified that the Olds-
mobile went into the air about five or six feet. (see 
Record 73 and 83). The witness Kenneth H. Silcox 
stated that the Oldsmobile went into the air about 
five or six feet (see Record 99 and 100). It might 
be pointed out to the Court tha.t Taylor testified 
that the one witness' testimony which he read said 
fiye or six feet, but that he used three feet (see 
Record 187). This indicates the extent to which 
outside information was used by Mr. Taylor. The 
two witnesses testified to the very facts which :Mr. 
Taylor took into consideration, and he figured tlu:) 
heighth less than either witness testified to. 
The fourth consideration was the amount of energy 
involved in forcing the Oldsmobile from its intend-
ed path to a path 10 feet distant. Exhibit 0 is drawn 
to scale and shows that the Oldsmobile was forced in 
a northwesterly direction 21 feet before it ~truck 
the gTound. By using the scale set forth on the 
diagram of Exhibit C, it appears that the distance 
north that the Oldsmobile travelled before again 
striking the ground is over ten feet. The items of 
this com;ideration were clearly in eviden~e. 
The fifth consideration under this proposition is 
the energy involved by the moveinent of the Ford . 
after the impact to its position of rest. Officer 
Pierce testifjpd to the ~kid marks 14 feet in length 
and which were made by the defendant's Ford 
automobile. These considerationR and proposi-
tions are set out in the wi.tncs~cs' testimony at 
Record 155 and 15G, Abstract Pag-e 34. 
We submit that the matters taken into considera-
tion by the expert Taylor were either introduced in 
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evidence or were personally observed by him. We 
point out to the Court that the defendant does not 
in any way question the qualifications of Mr. Tay-
lor as an expert to testify to the thing1s to which 
he did testify. The witness went thoroughly into 
the things which he took into consideration, and 
the manner in which he determined the speed of the 
defendant's automobile. All this was before the 
jury and the weight to be given to the question of 
speed which he gave was a question for the jury. 
There certainly coukl. be no prejudicial error here-
ARGUMENT NUMBER VI. 
Under this numbered argument defendant's coun-
sel contends that the State was limited to the acts 
of excessive rate of speed towit, forty miles per 
hour and failing to stop at a stop sign, as the basis 
for a conviction of Involuntary Manslaughter, and 
he sets out at length instruction number five given 
by the court. It should he noted that the laws set 
out as first and second in said instruction is a 
break-down of the reckless driving statute into two 
parts. 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Section 
57-7-15. 
The third and fourth statutes set out are the two 
definitions of speeding as contained in the statutes. 
Laws of Utah, 1935, Ch. 48, Section 57-7-16. 
The statute indicated as fifth was the statute fEl-
lating to stop signs. As heretofore indicated, tlw 
Bill of Particulars as well as the statement by coun-
sel for the State indicated to the defendant that the 
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:State would rely upon rerldP~~ driving, excessive 
t::peeding and running a stop sign. The reckless 
driving would be nmde up only of the acts of speed~ 
ing and running a stop sign. The court then in 
instruction number six stated that if the jury found 
that the defendant violated any of the foregoing 
provisions of the statutes in such a manner as to 
eYinee marked disregard for the safety of others, 
the defendant could be found guilty of man-
slaughter. These instructions were taken from the 
opinion of this Court in 
State v. Lingemen, 97 Utah 180; 91 J>. 
(2d) 457. 
Counsel contevds that these instructions permitted 
the jury to speculate on numerous grounds of reck-
lessness not set forth in the Bill of Particulars. 
Counsel also admits in his hdef on pages 18 and 
19 that there was no evidence introduced other than 
the acts of failing to stop at the stop sign and the 
speed at which the car was travelling. The jury 
was instructed in instruction number 11, set out 
at abstract page 65, that it was their hnperative 
and sworn duty to hear and determine the case on 
the testimony of the witnesses given on the trial 
and that in determining mwstjons of fact, they were 
not at liberty to indulge in conjectures not based on 
evidence introduced in the case, and it was nointed 
out to the jury that they should look solely to the 
evidence for the facts and to the instructions given 
by the court for the law, and to return a verdict 
according to the facts established by the evidence 
and law -laid down by the court. <:ertainly this 
Court cannot say that the ~ury did not folhw the 
in~trnrtions p-ivrn hv tl1P ~ourt and l":l.FlPG their vAr-
dict on som~thing that was not in evidence. The 
~Hate din not go oni"~idc nf tlw Bill 0f Particulars 
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in proving its case, and counsel tor the defendant 
admits this. 
ln view of this state of the record, it is difficult 
~o see how counsel could say that paragraph two of 
instruction number five would permit the jury to 
determine that the defendant drove his car without 
due caution and circumspection, regardless of 
whether h~ violated any speed law or failed to stop 
at the stop sign, when these two facts were the only 
ones introduced in evidence 
Under this numbered argument, counsel also -con-
tends that it was necessary for the State to prove 
a speed in excess of forty miles an hour under its 
Bill of Particulars. The Bill of Par'ticulars stated 
that defendant drove into an intersection at a dan-
gerous and excessive speed, towit, in excess of forty 
miles per hour. The statement that this speed was 
dangerous and excessive ~hows that the State in-
tended to charge a violation of the speeding laws of 
this State. Certainly any speed which violated 
these laws was an act which, if done in a manner 
that evinced a mar]red disregard for the safety of 
others, would sustain a conviction of Involuntary 
Manslaughter. The State would not he limited to 
a speed in excess of forty miles, hut any speed 
which constitutes a violation of the speed laws 
would be sufficient. In civil cases where a speed in 
miles per hour is alleged, the pleader is not limited 
to proof of such a speed. See 
Waller v. Graff, (Mo. App.), 251 S. W. 733. 
Debes v. Greenstone, (Tex.), 260 S. W. 211. 
Morrison v. Antwine, (Tex.), 51 S. W. (2d) 
820. 
White v. Zell, (Iowa), 276 N. W. 76. 
Hall v. Ponder, (Ga.), 179 S. E. 2'43. 
Alendal v. Madsen, 275 N. W. 352. 
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Instructions on speed in the words of statutes sinl-
ilar to that in the State of Utah have been held suf~ 
ficiently specific without requiring the jury to find 
that the automobile in question was going at an~; 
particular speed in miles per hour. 
Schultz v. State, 89 Neb. 34; 130 N. W. 972; 
33 L. R. A. ( K. S.) 403 ; Ann. Cas. 1912 
c 495. 
PeopJe v. Marconi, 118 Cal. App. 683; 5 P. 
(2d) 974. 
People v. Von Eckartsberg, Supra. 
We submit that there was no error in the instruc-
tions given. 
ARGUMENT NUMBER VII. 
Under this argument, counsel for the appellant in 
part reiterates some arguments heretofore made 
and which we have answered. 
He relies upon the court's refusal to give the de-
fendant's requested instruction number seven. In 
that request he wanted it pointed out to the jury 
that in districts outside of business or residence 
districts, that speed at all times should be reason-
able and safe under the general circumstances pre-
vailing on the highways, providing that such speed 
should not exceed fifty miles per hour. In so far 
as this part of the instruction is co.ncerned, the 
court placed no limit upon the speed at which the 
defendant could drive his automobile, so long as it 
was a safe and reasonahle speed within the pro~ 
visions of the law as set forth in instruction num-
ber five. Counsel certainly cannot object to a fail~ 
ure to place a top limit on the speed at which the 
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defendant travelled. He then defines the business 
district as territory so designated by local author-
ities, and clearly defined by signs posted on the 
highway at the limit of said district on the high~ 
way, and the residence district being the territory 
in cities and towns other than business districts. 
Under the Stipulation of eounsel, which appears at 
Record 206, Abstract 54, it appears that the sbuth 
line of 21st South Street is the end of Salt Lake 
City limits, and that the land south of that line is 
in Salt Lake County. The accident occurred within 
Salt Lake City since it was within the intersection 
of 3rd East and 21st South, which appears from 
this Stipulation, to be within Salt Lake City, and 
under the definition given by counsel in this re-
quested instruction, the speed of fifty miles per 
hour is not applicable. 
The defendant's requested instructions numbers 
nine, ten, and twelve were merely different ways 
of stating the disregard which defendant's conduct 
should evince before a conviction could be had. 1.1-,or 
instance in number nine, counsel requests that we 
jury must find a calloused disregard of human life, 
and in number ten, that the acts of the defendant 
must be done P.ither with a wilful intent to injure, 
or that recklessness and wanton disregard of the 
rights and safety of another as would be equivalent 
to an intent to injure, and in number twelv~, that 
the act be with a wilful and wanton disregard for 
the rights of others. The words of the Lingeman 
case are that the conduct must evince a marked dis-
regard for the safety of others, and this was the 
language used by the court in its instructions. 
No error was made in refusing these requests. 
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ARGU.Jl H~Nrl, NVl\fBER VIII. 
Counsel under this argument contends that the evi-
dence is insufficient to support the verdict of guilty 
rendered by the jury. . It is .the position of the 
State that the question of the defendant's guilt was 
one of fact which was. properly left to the jury 
under the facts of this case. 
State v. Lingeman, Supra. 
The evidence shows that the defendant, while in u 
hurry to get his girl hnme at 7 :00 A. lVI. in the morn-
ing, drove his automobile into the intersection of 
3rd East and 21st South without stopping at a. stop 
sign, which he should have done, at a speed of be-
tween forty and fifty-nine miles per hour, and ran 
into the automobile of Clark Romney, thereby 
causing his death. 
We submit that it takes no argument tnat sucn con-
duct violated the heretofore mentioned statutes of 
the State of Utah, and tha.t his conduct in doing 
this evinced a marked disregard for the safety of 
others. Counsel argues that there was not much 
traffic on the hig·hway. There was certainly enough 
traffic on the highway to require the defendant to 
act differently than he did. The deceased's car 
was on the highway, a.s well as the automobile of 
the witness Silcox. Defendant might well have 
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expected some traffic to be on the highway and 
especially at an intersection marked by a stop sigu. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that we have answered all of the argu-
ments of counsel that there is no error in the rec-
ord, and certainly nothing transpired prejudicial 
to the rights of the defendant. 
We therefore submit that the verdict and judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Attorney General of Utah 
A. U. MINER, 
Assistant Attorney General 
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS, 
District Attorney, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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